John Dewey and Antonio Gramsci: thinkers for our times by Hinchliffe, Geoffrey
John Dewey and Antonio Gramsci: thinkers for our times

Introduction
The lives of John Dewey (1859-1952) and Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) could not be of greater contrast in their personal circumstances; the one led a long, active, healthy and free life, whilst the other struggled in difficult social and political circumstances, suffered from ill-health and spent the last 10 years of his life in prison where he nevertheless succeeded in writing on history and philosophy. What makes a comparison fruitful is that both identified the central role that education plays in building a democratic way of life. Of course, as we shall see, the role of education was partly influenced by how each envisaged the emergence of democratic forms of government. In the case of Dewey, this emergence was essentially evolutionary: democracy emerged through the development of social characteristics for which democratic government was the most fitting. In the case of Gramsci, democracy could only emerge through political struggle and education was one of the sites of this struggle. In part these different views reflected the circumstances of each: it would have been difficult to realistically maintain an evolutionary mode of democracy in fascist Italy, just as the emphasis on struggle would have seemed odd for a country in which democratic forms of government, however imperfect, were a settled part of social life for at least one hundred and fifty years at the time when Democracy and Education was published.
But there are philosophical similarities as well. The most obvious is the idea of activity that lies at the heart of Gramsci’s ‘philosophy of praxis’ and the way in which Dewey viewed the development of experience as a result of enquiry. In both cases agent activity was not viewed as bare reason or rationality and neither was this activity reducible to a set of materialistic propositions. Rather, ideas changed as a result of experience which was itself formed through the interaction between the human and his/her world. In other words, both could be seen as subscribing to a basic kind of pragmatism (even if Gramsci himself tended to dismiss that particular philosophy as merely typical of a North American bourgeois worldview). Brendan Hogan sees this similarity as originating in a shared appreciation of the power of scientific enquiry which not only transforms the world but creates a critical intelligence, or, as he puts it, “a common project that these two Left Hegelians share, rooted in their conception of social creative intelligence advanced by critical self-consciousness” (Hogan, p. 109).
It was this shared philosophical outlook that placed praxis or ‘practico-activity’ at the heart of the development of the understanding which also led both men to endorse a particular kind of activity, namely that combination of intellect and practical intelligence which for Gramsci took the form of the ‘organic intellectual’ and for Dewey took the form of the scientist who not only understands the nature of scientific method but can also communicate its results (and its attendant difficulties) to an intelligent public. Indeed, for Dewey it is precisely this kind of activity that contributes to the building of what he termed in The Public and its Problems, the ‘Great Community’. (see, for example, his remarks on the need for scientists to communicate their findings in terms of their consequences, p. 173). Needless to say, ‘the great community’ requires that the recipients of communication can themselves understand the knowledge they have received and, also, can make use of it in ways that the originators – namely the scientists – might never have envisaged. For Dewey, this free exchange of ideas that also results in productive and beneficial results is one of the features of a democratic way of life; but, as we shall see, this way of seeing matters, is also endorsed by Gramsci as well.
It is, of course, idle to speculate what exactly Dewey might have made of Gramsci had he been fortunate enough to meet him. I think there is little doubt that he would have found such an encounter fascinating: after all, we have it on record that he regarded his series of encounters with Trotsky as “the most interesting single intellectual experience of my life” (quoted from Westbrook, p. 471). Dewey is on record for demurring from historical materialism on the grounds that it proposed a ‘single principle’ which was supposed to drive historical change; but as we shall see shortly, Gramsci could not be held to account on the grounds that his form of Marxism was of this, less nuanced, variety. Indeed, it is precisely because of this that a comparison between Dewey and Gramsci may, I hope, prove worthwhile. Their very different experiences, both personal and political form the basis for more than merely a textual comparison: for we can read Gramsci’s Selections from Prison Notebooks against Democracy and Education and vice-versa. Arguably, a comprehensive account of the role of education in democratic life needs to take account ideas from both texts – not as forming a convenient unity but rather as a tension that informs our reflective practice.
A Gramscian Critique of Dewey - political
The concept of hegemony emerged through a study of Italian political history in which Gramsci noted that for a social group to emerge supreme, two factors are involved: domination – the exercise of coercive power which could include subjugation through armed force; and the exercise of ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ so that such a group “becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to ‘lead’ as well” (SPN: 57-8). According to one commentator, hegemony is exercised primarily through the consent given by subaltern groups  to the leadership – moral, intellectual, cultural – exercised by dominant groups (Femia, 1981: 31). Hegemony consists in the supremacy of a set of ideas that privilege some social groups over others, that privilege certain activities over others. A good example would be the near-universal hegemonic position of business activity and the associated role of business leadership in most developed countries. Femia’s point is that hegemony is exercised through voluntary agreement by subordinate groups and initially suggests that hegemony consists solely in dominance of ideas (24). A further implication is that dominance can be achieved through the configurement of institutions and agencies of civil society, with the state playing a subordinate role in establishing supremacy. But within a few pages, Femia goes on to suggest that there is an ‘interpenetration of the two spheres’, i.e. state and civil society (27), leaving the reader perplexed as to just what hegemony actually consists of. The most convincing analysis is that of Perry Anderson (1976). Anderson suggests that there are three versions of hegemony elaborated by Gramsci in his SPN. In the first it is suggested that there is a preponderance of civil society over the state which is equivalent to a preponderance of ‘hegemony’ over coercion. This echoes Femia’s initial analysis (noted above) in so far as hegemony is seen as being exercised through cultural dominance so that the acceptance of hegemony is largely consensual. Anderson’s complaint about this version is that it neglects the ‘juridical-political component of the state’ (Anderson 1976: 29): notwithstanding the role played by what might be termed ‘cultural hegemony’, it needs to be supplemented by state activity and back-up. This leads us to the second version in which hegemony is distributed between state and civil society.  Anderson suggests that this is an advance on the first version and only needs to be supplemented by a recognition that the state plays an explicit coercive role in addition to its juridical-political activities (Anderson: 31-32). The third version is only hinted at by Gramsci but Anderson detects, in Gramsci, the thought that state and civil society are merged into a larger unity. But since this abolishes the distinction between state and civil society by making all ideological/cultural activities a putative domain of the state, Anderson rejects this as being unrealistic. 
It is important to note that from Gramsci’s standpoint the analysis of hegemony was not merely a question of theoretical speculation. Despite being held in prison whilst elaborating these thoughts, Gramsci had a particular purpose which was orientated to a question of ‘praxis’, as he would have put it: given a particular historical configuration, he was concerned to elaborate the precise role of the ‘New Machiavelli’, as he imaginatively termed the modern political party, drawing explicitly on the ‘activist’ stance that he detected in Machiavelli’s The Prince. His writings have an urgency that Anderson succeeds in capturing as he orientates his discussion of Gramsci in the context of political conflict in the 1970’s. In particular, Anderson notes that oppositional forces need to establish a leadership through hegemonic activity (Anderson, 1976: 45, SPN: 57-58).  This opens up one role for education in the ‘political activist’ sense: for Gramsci, education was a key means whereby cadres of the working class and oppositional groups could challenge the prevailing hegemony and establish a supremacy in the domain of ideas prior to taking state power. This would make education, from a Gramscian standpoint, another potent political weapon but still a means to an end (political power). However, Gramsci’s analysis of the role that education plays goes much deeper than that of the activist perspective.
In considering the role of education, Gramsci observes that “the relationship between teacher and pupil is active and reciprocal” and then goes on to observe, however, that this educational relationship “should not be restricted to the field of strictly scholastic relationships”. He then suggests that:
“this form of relationship exists throughout society as a whole and for every individual relative to other individuals. It exists between intellectual and non-intellectual sections of the population, between rulers and the ruled, elites and their original followers, leaders and the led, the vanguard and the body of the army. Every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily an educational relationship”. (SPN: 350)
What is interesting here is that Gramsci is not merely saying that hegemonic relations are cultural but that they are educational – that is, hegemony is maintained and developed through a directed endeavour that is purposive in a number of respects: to re-enforce the moral authority of those in power, to develop perspectives that include some ideas and exclude others and to assist in the development of a self-identity for persons appropriate to their station in life.  At the same time, in so far as an educational relationship is scholastic or school-based relations of hegemony are not ones that are merely participative, sharing and optional: these educative relationships have a certain necessity inscribed within them.
For Gramsci, then, hegemonic relations may permeate democracy whether this is viewed in terms of governmental processes or democratic forms of life. In this sense his analysis is at odds with that of Dewey. As we know, Dewey saw democracy as emerging out of a form of ‘associated living’ where the purposes of men and women affect and influence each other either directly or indirectly (Dewey, 1985, p. 93). Democracy in its governmental form – that is, as a process – merely reflects forms of living which are already in place. Democratic process helps to develop further the associations already existing between persons. These ideas are developed more fully in The Public and its Problems in which Dewey attempts to cut through mainstream thinking in political philosophy. In this book he tells us that the ‘public’ is formed – or rather emerges – as soon as there is an awareness that the indirect effects of associated living require to be identified and managed. The ‘public’ arises out of the indirect consequences of singular activities (Dewey, 1927, p. 35). The state therefore is viewed essentially as a mechanism for addressing and administering those concerns – for example, transport arrangements or public utilities – that cannot be adequately addressed by individuals in their singular capacity.  As he puts it,  “the public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions  to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for.” (Dewey, 1927, p. 15-16) Thus the state emerges as a practical necessity and Dewey is at pains to argue that there is no need to look for some “causal agency, of authorship of forces which are supposed to produce a state by an intrinsic vis genetrix” (p. 37). The state, in other words, is not produced by a metaphysical will or, for that matter, by an historically grounded necessity, such as historical materialism.
What we are presented with by Dewey is what might be termed a genealogy of democracy. Taking the essential features of a democratic way of life – associated living of free individuals, a culture which supports and encourages free activity, governmental processes that enable associated living to be supported and maintained – we then might ask: how could this democratic way of life emerge? Dewey provides us with a story of how this can happen, in which the management of ‘indirect consequences’ of actions is central. Thus, taking the component of a democratic culture as one feature of this genealogy, we can see how this will foster the idea of free activity and enquiry and how the whole idea of ‘free enquiry’ is part of what is understood as a democratic way of life. But the consequences of free enquiry have to be managed; this ‘management’ is itself the object of free enquiry and critique so that the processes themselves for managing indirect consequences take on a democratic character. As Dewey presents his story it might seem at first as if ‘the public’ is merely the sum of indirect consequences. But as his account develops in The Public and its Problems it becomes clear that individuals need to think of themselves as comprising a ‘public’ and that a crucial development in this genealogy is the awareness of persons who are not only free as discrete individuals but who also comprise a body of persons as part of a community. Dewey outlines the idea of community as follows:
“No amount of aggregated collective action of itself constitutes a community. For beings who observe and think, and whose ideas are absorbed by impulses and become sentiments and interests, “we” is as inevitable as “I”. But “we” and “our” exist only when consequences of combined action are perceived and become an object of desire and effort.” (P. 151)
He goes on to argue that the ‘public’ only becomes a community when beliefs and opinions are forged through enquiry, the results of which are freely communicated. A democratic way of life requires an educated public to sustain it.
This genealogy of democracy is attractive in so far as democratic cultures and processes emerge out of the recognisable activity of persons living in an industrial and technological age. Democracy is therefore rooted in the practical activities – the  ‘beings and doings’ of ordinary people. It does not need great rhetorical or philosophical discourses for its justification; democracy works with the grain of social nature.
However, Dewey is also acutely aware of the problems faced by democracy, problems which are discussed at length in the chapter in The Public and its Problems entitled ‘Eclipse of the Public’. Dewey acknowledges early on in that chapter his debts to the contemporary, Walter Lippmann (p. 116) who developed an highly influential deflationary perspective of democratic life. Essentially, Lippmann proposed that democratic politics could be seen as the competition by elites for the people’s votes. It was the elites who formed and shaped the political agenda and they were able to do this for two reasons. First there was a huge inequality between power, wealth and status which allowed some individuals to assume leading roles – whether as policy makers or as opinion formers or both. This diminished the active role of citizens to merely choosing between pre-set rival programmes. The second reason lay in the changing nature of the ‘public’. Lippmann maintained that the public, as construed in the literature of enthusiasts for democracy was a mere phantom: the educated public favoured by persons such as Dewey simply did not exist, partly because people simply had no interest in the ‘indirect consequences’ of their activities and were very content indeed to let others worry about these. Dewey himself noted that “the machine age has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified and complicated the scope of the indirect consequences… (that)…..there are too many publics and too much of public concern for our existing resources to cope with” (Dewey, 1927, p. 126). However, rather than  doubting that an educated public could be developed,  rather he proposed that the public was merely ‘in eclipse’: “Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the Public will remain in eclipse” (Dewey, 1927, p. 142).​[1]​
From a Gramscian standpoint, Lippmann is merely articulating conditions of hegemony. Lippmann’s only fault is that he is possibly being too honest; an elite is likely to ensure that it conforms to the norms of democratic ideology, including consultation exercises and direct communication through print and online technologies. Otherwise, the state of affairs described by Lippmann is entirely normal since differentials of power are inscribed in the very structures of democratic processes. The manipulation of the public, the lack of interest by citizens in public affairs, the seeming consummation of sections of the citizenry in private matters, even the frequent denunciation of all politicians as ‘only out for themselves’ – all these stances merely testify to, and confirm those existing hegemonic structures. By contrast, Dewey’s genealogical model make these structures of domination into unfortunate aberrations, all the more vexing because of their sheer persistence. Dewey is well aware of differentials in power and influence but it seems as though for him, the development of democracy is premised on the expungement of those differentials that have distorted the democratic self-image. The genealogy presents us with a kind of originary, unsullied democracy. By contrast, Gramsci presents us with a clear oppositional programme in which democratic processes are themselves developed through counter-hegemonic activity.  Democracy is premised on conflict and progresses through conflict; the concept of hegemony gives us a way of seeing how this conflict is structured. Moreover, by characterising the hegemonic relation as educational Gramsci enables us to see in more detail how hegemony works and how it can be challenged, in the name of democracy.
From a Gramscian perspective the most significant weakness in Dewey’s approach is a failure to situate a vision of a democratic concept of education within a configuration of culture and power which, as it happens, tends to undermine that vision. The problem is not so much that the democratic vision is hard to realise but that in Dewey’s account we are at a loss to understand why this might be the case. It is for this reason – and this is to cast no doubt on Dewey’s radical credentials – that a deeper, more nuanced account of democracy is needed. It needs to shed light on this initial question: “How does one conceptualise the dual role of education which both maintains a power-cultural complex and also holds out the promise of change?” 

Gramsci’s Concept of Education
Gramsci held to the view that all persons, irrespective of societal position, are potentially receptive to education (here, of course, both Dewey and Gramsci are in agreement).  In the section of the Notebooks entitled ‘The Study of Philosophy’, Gramsci proposes the idea that “it is essential to destroy the widespread prejudice that philosophy is a strange and difficult thing” and goes on to suggest that “it must first be shown that all men are philosophers” (SPN: 323). He does not mean, as a matter of fact, that all persons think in a critical manner and are familiar at handling arguments and abstract concepts. But he does think that all ‘men’ have the potential to be philosophers and gives a number of reasons as to why this is the case. One reason is that engagement with language carries with it a specific conception of the world, even if this is disjointed. Moreover, “there is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: homo faber cannot be separated from homo sapiens” and Gramsci amplifies this thought as follows:
“Each man…..carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a ‘philosopher’, an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought.” (SPN: 9)
The idea of the modern intellectual was further seen as someone who is no longer engaged primarily in rhetoric but someone who has an “active participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser” (SPN: 10). This is not someone who exists as a mere learner: for Gramsci, each person has a philosophical-intellectual dimension that enables them to play a part in constructing society both in terms of its physical, material character and at the level of meaning. The trope of philosopher lies at the very heart of the counter-hegemonic education that Gramsci favoured. The hallmark of the philosopher, then, is a certain critical stance within a historical juncture. It is not so much the discovery of an essential self that lies within but the creation or construction of an historical/political self whose dynamic is sustained through critical activity. The philosopher-intellectual is not merely ‘bookish’; rather his or her critical stance arises directly out of a sustained engagement with the world, an engagement that could take on a technical or professional character (Coben, 2002: 271). For Gramsci, the emergence of a philosopher does not happen by chance and cannot be left to a person’s own efforts. There needs to be a sustained educative process which has to be directed towards the development of a critical stance. 
Just as the philosopher-intellectual is historically formed so is the non-critical raw material on which education is to work. The teacher educates children/students who already have perspectives and outlooks which amount to the non-critical baggage of what Gramsci terms ‘common sense’. Common sense too has a history (SPN: 325-6) and counter-hegemonic education may have to directly challenge and confront it.  By ‘common sense’, Gramsci is referring to what he terms a “chaotic aggregate of disparate conceptions” though he goes on to say that this “does not mean that there are no truths in common sense.” Yet he immediately qualifies his qualification by saying that “common sense is an ambiguous, contradictory and multiform concept and that to refer to common sense as a confirmation of truth is a nonsense” (SPN: 422-423). It is termed “the philosophy of non-philosophers”, of which:
“its most fundamental characteristic is that it is a conception which, even in the brain of one individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of the masses whose philosophy it is.” (SPN: 419)
Earlier in the Prison Notebooks he gives common sense an almost post-modernist character by terming it “an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory” (SPN: 324). At the same time, Gramsci qualifies this view by insisting that “we are all conformists of some conformism or other, always man-in-the-mass or collective man” and that these views and beliefs associated with common sense are an amalgam of “stone age elements and principles of more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at a local level and intuitions of a future philosophy” (SPN: 324). The business of raising oneself above common sense is a task that confronts all individuals and the implication is that this is a continuous process. Aspects of common sense do indeed contain what Gramsci terms ‘good sense’ and in SPN: 328 he gives an example of the belief in the need to “overcome bestial and elemental passions through a conception of necessity which gives a conscious direction to one’s activity.” The educator must start by accepting and acknowledging the beliefs associated with common sense in order to develop more critical and coherent perspectives on the part of her students. Above all, we can say that common sense reflects and helps to maintain a particular hegemonic order. For Gramsci, an educative order simply fails if it merely consolidates common sense. Pedagogies that fail to move learners on from common sense, no matter how benign and comfortable, also fail to recognise that ‘all men are philosophers’. 
There is, however, another aspect to common sense too: namely those beliefs held by subaltern groups, beliefs that confirm their members in their state of dependency. Thus the common sense of subaltern groups takes on a specific character of fatalism, submissiveness and a certain helplessness and resignation. Gramsci suggests that a “mechanistic conception of reality has been a religion of the subalterns” (SPN: 337) and goes on to link such a conception with a particular form of Christianity which focusses on the interiority of the soul. But he also explores another aspect of this ‘mechanism’, which is the separation of theory and practice, observing that this separation is merely conventional (SPN: 335) and that “people speak about theory as a ‘complement’ or an ‘accessory’ of practice, or as a handmaid of practice”. As Diana Coben observes, the notion that theory should be subordinate to practice is another facet of the religion of the subaltern (Coben 2002: 270). And it is with some degree of clarity that Gramsci firmly distinguishes the outlook of dependency from one that is self-determined:
“Is it better to take part in a conception of the world mechanically imposed by the external environment, i.e. by one of the many social groups in which everyone is automatically involved from the moment of his entry into the conscious world (and this can be one’s own village or province; it can have its origins in the parish and the ‘intellectual activity’ of the local priest or ageing patriarch whose wisdom is law, or in the little old woman who has inherited the lore of witches or the minor intellectual soured by his own stupidity and inability to act)? Or, on the other hand, is it better to work out, consciously and critically one’s own conception of the world and thus, in connection with the labours of one’s own brain, choose one’s sphere of activity, take an active part in the creation of the history of the world, be one’s own guide, refusing to accept passively and supinely from outside the moulding of one’s personality?” (SPN: 323-4)
Finally, Gramsci puts forward the idea that what he terms  an ‘educational principle’ comprises the idea of work which  “is the specific mode by which man actively participates in natural life in order to transform and socialise it more and more deeply” (SPN: 34). He goes on to say that work involves “theoretical and practical activity” through which a human world is created that is free of magic and superstition and which is populated by people who “appreciate the sum of effort and sacrifice which the present has cost the past and which the future is costing the present and which conceives the contemporary world as a synthesis of the past…..which projects itself into the future.” (ibid). This  conception is close to Dewey’s pragmatism for which agency “is to maintain the continuity of  knowing with an activity which purposefully modifies the environment” (Dewey, 1985, p. 354). Gramsci’s concept of praxis can be interpreted as a historicised pragmatism.
We can see how although there are similarities, Gramsci’s ideas on education constitute a major challenge for Dewey. For example, in Democracy and Education, Dewey views the notion of ‘experience’ as both a ‘trying and an ‘undergoing’: “when we experience something we act upon it, we do something with it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences” (Dewey, 1985, p. 146). But this privileging of experience risks merely confirming subalterns in their role as bearers of  ‘common sense’. Because Dewey is reluctant to frame his educational postulates within an historical setting the common/good sense distinction cannot be established. This means that the enquiring individual who encounters problems and overcomes them may do so entirely without ever leaving the plane of common sense. Indeed, it may even be the case that what Dewey sees as ‘conjoint activity’ driven by enquiry merely confirms and consolidates those hegemonic relations which in part frame what is worth enquiring about in the first place. Whereas for Gramsci ‘all men are philosophers’ such a phrase would, I think,  be treated with the greatest suspicion by Dewey. In  this sense Gramsci is more democratic than Dewey since the former sees the store of accumulated knowledge as being potentially available to all ‘men’, whereas for Dewey, such a store is to be treated with suspicion in case it deflects persons from pursuing social and critical enquiry for which they are best fitted – namely the analysis and clarification of problems arising from the undergoing of experience. 
Hence it should come as no surprise that for Gramsci the curriculum should impart a “general, humanistic, culture” (SPN: 27). That, historically speaking, this form of curriculum had only been available to an elite does not detract from its being the product of praxis – ‘work’ - the engagement with which is a precondition for a formative education for persons who are not merely self-determining but are able, of themselves, to carry on ‘projecting into the future’. And although Gramsci fully recognises that Latin and Greek need to be replaced by modern languages as curricular subjects, he nonetheless insists that a broadly humanistic curriculum is needed as a precursor to future specialisation, including vocational education. Specialisation (of a vocational nature) that took place too early would mean that children and students would be disengaged from their past and disconnected from possible futures; as mere prisoners of the present, children would already be set up for a life of dependency in which the creeds of the subaltern classes would be taken as great truths. Education can only succeed for Gramsci if there is a clear programme of taking children (and adults) away from common sense, away from the culture of subalternship. Dewey’s scepticism regarding the traditional curriculum does no favours for those children and students who desperately need to spread and deepen their horizons.
A Deweyan critique of Gramsci.
Both authors strongly favour the common school (Dewey, 1985, p. 265); Gramsci famously criticised the introduction of specialised vocational schools in his own country – see SPN, p. 40). Here we can see how the democratic vision of the two men converge, despite theoretical differences. Indeed, it was one of Gramsci’s achievements – despite his incarceration – to have successfully identified one of the key features of the Gentile Reform Act of 1923, in Italy.  This was the multiplication, not only of types of curriculum (with a vocational, activity-based curriculum held to be more ‘suitable’ for most children and young adults) but the multiplication of types of school. Gramsci’s words are worth quoting in full here:
“Schools of the vocational type, i.e. those designed to satisfy immediate, practical interests are beginning to predominate over the formative school, which is not immediately ‘interested’. The most paradoxical aspect of it all is that this new type of school appears and is advocated as being democratic, while in fact it is destined not merely to perpetuate social differences but to crystallise them in Chinese complexities.” (SPN: 40)  
The temptation to diminish curricular strength in favour of social relevance also ran the risk of merely confirming members of lower social groups in their subaltern role. 
Yet from a Deweyan perspective, Gramsci’s attachment to what seems to be a conservative pedagogy undermines the claims to radicalism and renders the latter’s democratic vision problematic. It is unclear how the experience of subaltern groups can be mobilised in such a way to become educationally significant; rather, their transformation into free agents is hampered by an instructional mode of learning, so beloved by educational conservatives who quote Gramsci at will (see Gove, 2013 and Hirsch, 1996). 
Yet Gramsci was concerned that the instructional component of learning be preserved. The danger of what he termed the ‘new pedagogy’ was that if the “nexus between instruction and education is dissolved, while the problem of teaching is conjured away by cardboard schemata exalting educativity, the teacher’s work will as a result become yet more inadequate” (SPN: 36). However, it is worth noting that Gramsci does not endorse the teaching of more information: whilst he is concerned that the customary ‘baggage of concrete facts’ may be imperilled he recognises that even the acquisition of this, by itself, does not amount to an education for the accumulation of information only amounts to the mechanical part of teaching (SPN: 36). Thus, for Gramsci there are two features of what characterises an inferior pedagogy: the first is where there is no instructional component at all and where schools are merely ‘rhetorical’; the second is where instruction is mechanical and produces the mere accumulation of facts and information. Whilst criticism of the latter feature was entirely legitimate, the replacement of this with a pedagogy of ‘cardboard schemata’ was no answer either. 
However, there is one other important aspect to Gramsci’s thinking about pedagogy which concerns the passage from an instructional mode of learning to one that is more creative, in which the pupil passes to a phase of “independent, autonomous work”. Indeed, Gramsci makes a distinction between an ‘active ‘ school – that is one in which learners are not merely passive - and a creative school which does not indicate a school of “inventors and discoverers” as much as a “method of research and of knowledge”, in which the teacher exercises a function of “friendly guide”. For, according to Gramsci, there can come a stage in a pupil’s maturity – particularly regarding the emergence of investigative powers - when “to discover a truth oneself is to create – even if the truth is an old one” (SPN: 31-33). Gramsci clearly has in mind the idea that the creative phase is preceded by a phase of education which is instructional and even “dogmatic” (SPN: 31) and here, one feels, a Deweyan would be unhappy. Why, one wonders – even accepting the point that instruction is a part of education – cannot the creative phase be one that is entertained for younger children, even very young children? Given, as Gramsci emphasises himself, that creativity does not imply ‘originality of research’ why is it not possible to envisage learning as taking a creative character that complements learning in its instructional mode?
Dewey’s concept of creativity is well-known and is centred on the idea of an undergoing of an experience in which the ends sought for unfold as the experience itself unfolds  For this to happen:
“the pupil (must) have a genuine situation of experience – that there be continuous activity in which he is interested for its own sake; secondly, that a genuine problem develop within this situation as a stimulus to thought; third, that he possess the information and make the observations needed to deal with it; fourth, that suggested solutions occur to him which he shall be responsible for developing in an orderly way; and fifth, that he have opportunity and occasion to test his ideas by application, to make their meaning clear and to discover for himself their validity”. (Dewey, 1985, p. 170).
This gives us a non-instructional mode of learning which is applicable at all ages. Moreover it is a kind of learning which gives the child not only the mental  resources but the confidence to develop further – the confidence to confront common sense and to advance beyond it.
Conclusion
I have suggested that Gramsci provides tools through which a powerful – but constructive – critique can be made of Dewey’s conception of democracy but that Dewey’s notion of pedagogy seems more highly developed than that of Gramsci. However, it also seems to me that Dewey’s non-conflictual conceptions of democracy (“a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience”, Dewey, 1985, p. 93) and the public (which arises from “all those modes of associated behaviour (which) may have extensive and enduring consequences which involve others beyond those directly engaged in them”, Dewey, 1954, p. 27) could be interpreted as a deepening of Gramsci’s concept of counter-hegemony. For it enables Dewey to formulate conceptions of education and learning that are not merely oppositional and gives us a conception of experience that takes into account consequences and unintended effects which education can uncover and analyse. A genealogical view of democracy does, I submit, give us a clear ‘end-in-view’ even now, for the twenty-first century. It gives us a clear picture of a democratic way of life, considered as a social and political whole, which, rooted in the idea of experience as it is, is both conceivable and achievable. It does not seem to me to be a conception that Gramsci would have much to quarrel with. But to get there, we must first overcome that hegemonic terrain that lies in the way.
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^1	  Lippmann’s account of what sometimes termed is ‘democratic elitism’ can be found in Lippmann, 1922 and 1925. Joseph Schumpeter also gives a clear statement of a limited democracy in his Capitalism, socialism, and democracy (1976). For a good account of Lippmann’s views and Dewey’s response, see Westbrook (1991), p. 294-318.
